Jesse Prinz

Graduate Center of the City University of New York, Philosophy, Faculty Member

3,297 Followers 749 Following 4 Co-authorsTotal Views

Papers

The Aesthetic Self. The Importance of Aesthetic Taste in Music and Art for Our Perceived Identity

Frontiers in Psychology, 2021

To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this pap... more To what extent do aesthetic taste and our interest in the arts constitute who we are? In this paper, we present a series of empirical findings that suggest an Aesthetic Self Effect supporting the claim that our aesthetic engagements are a central component of our identity. Counterfactual changes in aesthetic preferences, for example, moving from liking classical music to liking pop, are perceived as altering us as a person. The Aesthetic Self Effect is as strong as the impact of moral changes, such as altering political partisanship or religious orientation, and significantly stronger than for other categories of taste, such as food preferences (Study 1). Using a multidimensional scaling technique to map perceived aesthetic similarities among musical genres, we determined that aesthetic distances between genres correlate highly with the perceived difference in identity (Study 2). Further studies generalize the Aesthetic Self Effect beyond the musical domain: general changes in visua...

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Accessed, Accessible, and Inaccessible: Where to Draw the Phenomenal Line

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007

Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural mac... more

Against Outsider Art

Journal of Social Philosophy, 2017

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Embodiment Context Sensitivity and Discrete Emotions

by Jesse Prinz and Gen Eickers

Psychological Inquiry, 2017

Agnes Moors (this issue) argues for the eliminativism of discrete emotion categories. She present... more Agnes Moors (this issue) argues for the eliminativism of discrete emotion categories. She presents four objections against classical theories of emotion, such as affect program theory, which emphasizes emotional embodiment. These objections, however, do not refute discrete emotions. In this commentary we defend discrete emotion categories, arguing for both their functional coherence and the thesis that emotions are embodied.

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Is Love an Emotion?

by Jesse Prinz and Arina Pismenny

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017

What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary f... more What kind of mental phenomenon is romantic love? Many philosophers, psychologists, and ordinary folk treat it as an emotion. This chapter argues the category of emotion is inadequate to account for romantic love. It examines major emotion theories in philosophy and psychology and shows that they fail to illustrate that romantic love is an emotion. It considers the categories of basic emotions and emotion complexes, and demonstrates they too come short in accounting for romantic love. It assesses the roles of culture and evolution in shaping the romantic love phenomenon and evaluates the ways in which the norms of rationality that are applied to standard emotions fail to apply to love. It considers the category of sentiments and argue that despite coming close, it does not adequately capture the nature of romantic love. Finally, the chapter makes a case for love being best characterized as a syndrome.

Where Do Morals Come From? – A Plea for a Cultural Approach

Empirically Informed Ethics: Morality between Facts and Norms

An Enactivist Theory of Emotional Content

The Ontology of Emotions

Parole and the moral self: Moral change mitigates responsibility

Journal of Moral Education

Wonder, appreciation, and the value of art

Progress in brain research, 2018

There has been much work on what people appreciate in art, but comparatively little on what feeli... more There has been much work on what people appreciate in art, but comparatively little on what feelings of appreciation consist in. What do people feel when they encounter artworks that they value? We propose that the value of art is registered by the emotion of wonder. Departing from some standard approaches in empirical aesthetics, we focus on the appreciation of art as art rather than mere aesthetic preference. Aesthetic preferences can have many different correlates outside the domain of art (as when we select graphically appealing consumer items or judge the attractiveness of people), and preference judgments with respect to art can reflect nonaesthetic considerations and tell us rather little about art appreciation. We argue that when it comes to the appreciation of art as such, wonder plays a special role. We introduce wonder and compare it to other candidates that are discussed in the recent empirical literature, such as beauty, interest, and being moved. We analyze wonder and ...

For Valence

Emotion Review

In a provocative and important article, Robert Solomon argues that emotion researchers should aba... more In a provocative and important article, Robert Solomon argues that emotion researchers should abandon the notion of valence: it is used many different ways, and no single construct captures the pretheoretical distinction between positive and negative emotions. I echo Solomon in arguing that some of the most popular theories of valence are unlikely to succeed, though my case against these constructs comes from a noncognitive, as opposed to cognitive, perspective. I then argue that there is one notion of valence, related to reward and punishment, that may apply to all emotions, and align with pretheoretical taxonomies.

Is Love an Emotion?

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017

Really Bad Taste

Philosophical Studies Series, 2000

Is Emotion a Form of Perception?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2006

Theories of emotions traditionally divide into two categories. According to some researchers, emo... more Theories of emotions traditionally divide into two categories. According to some researchers, emotions are or essentially involve evaluative thoughts or judgments. These are called cognitive theories. According to other researchers, an emotion can occur without any thought. These are called non-cognitive theories. Some defenders of non-cognitive theories argue that emotions are action tendencies, others say they are feelings, and still others say they are affect programs, which encompass a range of internal and external events. One of the most celebrated non-cognitive theories owes, independently, to William James and Carl Lange. According to them, emotions are perceptions of patterned changes in the body. I think the perceptual theory of emotions is basically correct, but it needs to be updated. In this discussion, I will offer a summary and defence.The question I am addressing bears on the question of modularity. Within cognitive science, there is a widespread view that perceptual...

A Reply to Marcel

Consciousness and Cognition, Jul 1, 2000

Wittgenstein and the Neuroscience of the Self

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2011

Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Dec 31, 2002

Many materialists believe that we should, in principle, be able to build a con-scious computing m... more

When is Film Art?

Revue Internationale De Philosophie, 2010

Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism?

Mind & Language, 2010

ABSTRACT In this commentary, I focus on Machery&#39;s criticism of Neo-Empiricism. I argue th... more

Concepts, Philosophical Issues About

Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, 2006

Sentimentalism and Self-Directed Emotions

Self-Evaluation, 2011

The Aesthetic Self. The Importance of Aesthetic Taste in Music and Art for Our Perceived Identity

Frontiers in Psychology, 2021

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Accessed, Accessible, and Inaccessible: Where to Draw the Phenomenal Line

Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 2007

Abstract: How can we disentangle the neural basis of phenomenal consciousness from the neural mac... more

Against Outsider Art

Journal of Social Philosophy, 2017

Download

Embodiment Context Sensitivity and Discrete Emotions

by Jesse Prinz and Gen Eickers

Psychological Inquiry, 2017

Download

Is Love an Emotion?

by Jesse Prinz and Arina Pismenny

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017

Where Do Morals Come From? – A Plea for a Cultural Approach

Empirically Informed Ethics: Morality between Facts and Norms

An Enactivist Theory of Emotional Content

The Ontology of Emotions

Parole and the moral self: Moral change mitigates responsibility

Journal of Moral Education

Wonder, appreciation, and the value of art

Progress in brain research, 2018

For Valence

Emotion Review

Is Love an Emotion?

Oxford Handbooks Online, 2017

Really Bad Taste

Philosophical Studies Series, 2000

Is Emotion a Form of Perception?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy, 2006

A Reply to Marcel

Consciousness and Cognition, Jul 1, 2000

Wittgenstein and the Neuroscience of the Self

American Philosophical Quarterly, 2011

Level-Headed Mysterianism and Artificial Experience

Journal of Consciousness Studies, Dec 31, 2002

Many materialists believe that we should, in principle, be able to build a con-scious computing m... more

When is Film Art?

Revue Internationale De Philosophie, 2010

Can Concept Empiricism Forestall Eliminativism?

Mind & Language, 2010

ABSTRACT In this commentary, I focus on Machery&#39;s criticism of Neo-Empiricism. I argue th... more

Concepts, Philosophical Issues About

Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science, 2006

Sentimentalism and Self-Directed Emotions

Self-Evaluation, 2011

Mind and Cognition (edited volume)

The Conscious Brain

Beyond Human Nature

The Emotional Construction of Morals

Gut Reactions

Furnishing the Mind

Dialogues on Disability: Shelley Tremain Interviews Jesse Prinz (posted at BIOPOLITICAL PHILOSOPHY)

by Shelley L Tremain and Jesse Prinz

Hello, I'm Shelley Tremain and I'd like to welcome you to the eleventh installment of Dialogues o... more Hello, I'm Shelley Tremain and I'd like to welcome you to the eleventh installment of Dialogues on Disability, the series of interviews that I am conducting with disabled philosophers and post here on the third Wednesday of each month. The series is designed to provide a public venue for discussion with disabled philosophers about a range of topics, including their philosophical work on disability; the place of philosophy of disability vis-à-vis the discipline and profession; their experiences of institutional discrimination and personal prejudice in philosophy, in particular, and in academia, more generally; resistance to ableism; accessibility; and anti-oppressive pedagogy.

My guest today is Jesse Prinz.

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